Posts Tagged ‘quiescence’
This was the first of three posts exploring the connections between Karen Ho’s Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street, and so-called “education reform.” I have Alexis Goldstein to thank for pushing to to stop talking about this idea and just do it.
[T]his sort of smartness infuses the movement for corporate education reform. It can be seen in the pattern of seeking to provide maximum power to a few executives over public education, displacing the authority of schools boards, unions and the constituencies these represent: parents and teachers, and more broadly, citizens. This can mean mayoral control over schools, or top school administrators (some, like in Chicago, now labeled CEOs), or state appointed boards like Philadelphia’s School Reform Commission. The idea that a single strong authority can “fix” schools by overriding the concerns of other stakeholders is so commonplace it was the theme of the movie Waiting for Superman, which focused on reform darling / authoritarian and DC Chancellor Michele Rhee. Rhee made a name for herself through her confrontational style in relation to teachers and parents, famously taking a film crew along with her to fire a teacher. Significant experience teaching or administering schools is not required to wield this sort of unchecked power.
One of the most important concepts for understanding politics is quiescence. The great political scientist Murray Edelman placed the production of quiescence and arousal at the center of his approach to politics.
Government affects behavior chiefly by shaping the cognitions of large numbers of people in ambiguous situations. It helps create their beliefs about what is proper; their perceptions about what is fact; and their expectations of what is to come. In the shaping of expectations of the future the cues from government often encounter few qualifying or competing cues from other sources; and this function of political activity is therefore an especially potent influence upon behavior.
To make this point is to deny or seriously qualify what may be the most widely held assumption about political interactions: that political arousal and quiescence depend upon how much of that they want from government people get. Political actions chiefly arouse of satisfy people not by granting or withholding their stable demands, but rather by changing the demands and the expectations. (Emphasis in the original. Politics as Symbolic Action.)
For Edelman, the key to understanding politics is the ways the demands made by the public are managed, not how they are fulfilled. Often this is done through the use of symbols.For example, think about how in response to the Fight for 15 protests, Democrats have embraced a $10.10 minimum wage, including voting on it in the Senate, even though it has zero chance of making it even through that body. This has included the president imposing it on federal contractors, with the caveat that it would only apply to new contracts (making his earlier feet dragging consequential). Similarly we see states like Maryland enact $10.10 but limit its scope and extend the timeline for when the full new minimum should be imposed. The long timeline will make pushing for additional raises more difficult, although not impossible. In Seattle, where activists have successfully pushed the 15 dollar number onto the agenda, the mayor’s proposal has all sorts of loop holes, even as he claims to be leading the 15 dollar cause. The top number is the symbol, while the details are used to limit its impact.
Mark Graber takes “constitutional populists” to task for failing to blame the real culprits when it comes to our broken system—the people.
Constitutional populists always assign the blame for constitutional failings to evil institutions which are thwarting the good American people from fully realizing their constitutional commitment to the “Blessings of Liberty.” If we can just get rid of the Electoral College, eliminate state equality in the Senate, abandon life tenure for federal justices, and change the rules for constitutional amendment, my friend Sandy Levinson and others imply, gridlock would disappear, the American people would cherish their governing officials, and most other ills of contemporary American politics would be significantly alleviated.
This populist optimism fails to acknowledge that the cause of most contemporary constitution ills lie in the character of the American people rather than in American constitutional institutions. Consider that one major party in the United States routinely runs candidates for public office, most notably the presidency, who deny basic scientific and social science findings. Give me a billion dollar backer, and I thought I could make hay in the Republican primaries on a platform that questioned the Pythagorean Theorem (the theorem is un-American and no one in the academy permits any dissent from liberal right-triangle orthodoxy). One does not have to be too skillful at “connecting the dots,” to quote my friend again, to realize that no commonly proposed constitutional amendment is responsive to a society many of whose members reject evolution and think that Mary and Ben’s thirty year marriage will somehow be affected if John and Tony are also allowed to be married.
First off, it seems clear that there is a vast difference between arguing that some reform is needed and believing that achieving that reform will bring about a utopia. As near as I can tell, this is a strawman. From what I’ve seen of Levinson, he’s implied no such thing. People generally want to improve institutional structures to improve politics, which I think we all appreciate is a messy business. Unless you’re trying to place control in the hands of some unaccountable body (Supreme Court, the Fed, etc.) you probably don’t think politics will disappear.
The second point is an example of a fairly common error in logic. Graber’s proof that it’s the people who are the cause of our ills rather than our institutions is statements of candidates running for office and their success. But you can’t prove an outcome is caused by some factor by pointing to the outcome alone. The whole argument hinges on the assumption that causation runs from the mass of individuals to the functioning of institutions. It makes more sense to assume that institutions produce such beliefs, to the extent they exist, in people. But either way, stating the problem is the beginning of the argument, not the end.
A great deal of political science makes the same mistake, as does the bulk of political punditry. If Congress is dysfunctional, it must be because the people are increasingly polarized. (They aren’t.) If Republicans win elections, it must be because the people are increasingly conservative. (They aren’t). If a majority of people say something in a poll, that causes political outcomes, not vice versa. (Wrong again). (A great resource on all this is Class War?: What Americans Really Think about Economic Inequality by Page and Jacobs).
it strikes me that increasingly the power has been shifting towards those at the top. Political explanations that rely on formal understandings of how politics work confuse justifications for explanations.
The myth of democratic efficiency is a cop out. It reassures us that we bear no responsibility for changing things. It means we don’t have to contest these issues, and seek to change the views of our fellow Americans. It means we don’t have to build better institutions, mobilize our side, or articular what it is we believe. It makes us quiescent.
Given the challenges we face, that’s the last thing we need.
One might assume that [luxury hotel] workers’ admired guests’ wealth because they identified with guests or aspired to be rich themselves. In my twelve months in both hotels, however, I spoke with only two workers who explicitly dreamed of consuming at the same level as guests. Few workers seemed to believe or even wonder whether they could reach these heights of consumption, and often they criticized guests for their extravagance. Rather, the wealth of the guests fostered status by association as guest privilege symbolically rubbed off on workers.
If politics is concerned with who gets what, or with the authoritative allocation of values, one may be pardoned for wondering why it need involve so much talk. An individual or group can most directly get what it wants by taking it or by force and can get nothing directly by talk. The obvious difficulty is the possibility of resistance, and it is the counterforce that talk may circumvent.
Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics